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ABSTRACT. In this conversation, Michael A. Peters discusses his philosophy of 
education in and for the age of digital media. The first part of the conversation clas- 
sifies Michael Peters’ work in three interlocked themes: philosophy, political knowl- 
edge economy, and academic publishing. It explores the power of dialogue for 
philosophical inquiry, positions dialogue in relation to human learning, and analyses 
the philosophical thesis of postdisciplinarity. It assesses the role of “big data” and 
“learning analytics” in (educational) research, and links various approaches to inquiry 
with creativity. The second part of the conversation introduces the notion of “phi- 
losophy as pedagogy,” and introduces Michael Peters’ philosophy of technology. It 
inquires the role of educational philosophy in the contemporary network society, and 
explores links between postmodernism / poststructuralism and (neo)Marxism. The 
third part of the conversation explores the relationships between universalism and 
the Internet, locates digital postcolonialism, and looks into legacy of the Frankfurt 
School for learning in the age of digital media. Finally, it discusses Michael Peters’ 
lifelong fascination with Ludwig Wittgenstein, and outlines the main trajectories of 
Wittgenstein’s work into present and future of educational philosophy.    
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Michael Adrian Peters is a philosopher, educator, global public intellectual, 
and one of the most important figures in contemporary philosophy of edu- 
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cation. Like many critical educators of his generation, Michael has working 
class background and started his career in high school teaching. After seven 
years, through PhD in the Philosophy of Education on the philosopher Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, he moved into the world of the academia. Through numerous 
adjunct and visiting positions, Michael was offered a Personal Chair at the 
University of Auckland (2000–2003), then became Research Professor at the 
University of Glasgow (2000–2005), and then was awarded an excellence 
hire position at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Today, 
Michael Peters is Professor of Education at Waikato University (New Zea- 
land), where he also co-directs the Global Studies in Education Program; 
Emeritus Professor at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (U.S.); 
Adjunct Professor in the School of Art, Royal Melbourne Institute of Tech- 
nology (Australia); Adjunct Professor at the School of Foreign Studies, Guang- 
zhou University (China); and Professorial Fellow in the School of Creative 
Arts, James Cook University (Australia). He is a lifelong Fellow of the New 
Zealand Academy of Humanities; a Honorary Fellow of the New Zealand 
Royal Society; a life member of the Society for Research in Higher Edu- 
cation (UK); and a life member of the Philosophy of Education Society of 
Australasia. He has been awarded an Honorary Doctorate of Letters from 
State University New York (U.S.) and an Honorary Doctorate of Philosophy 
from Aalborg University (Denmark). 
In Michael’s Liber amicorum, Peter Roberts writes: “The breadth of 
Michael’s scholarship is remarkable. He has published more books, on a 
greater array of themes and topics, than any other philosopher of education 
in the world. His reach extends well beyond the traditional range for scholars 
in this field” (2014: 540–542). In numbers, Michael’s opus spans over more 
than 60 books and 500 articles. He edits six journals: Educational Philosophy 
and Theory (since 1983), Knowledge Cultures (founding editor, since 2013), 
Policy Futures in Education (founding editor, since 2003), E-Learning & 
Digital Media (founding editor, since 2004), Open Review of Educational 
Research (founding editor, since 2014), and the upcoming The Video Journal 
of Education and Pedagogy (founding editor, starting in 2016). He also edits 
many book series, including: Contexts of Education, Key Critical Thinkers in 
Education, Open Education, Creative Education (with Tina Besley) (Sense), 
Global Studies in Education, Education and Struggle (with Peter McLaren) 
(Peter Lang), and New Directions in the Philosophy of Education (with Gert 
Biesta) (Taylor and Francis). Finally, Michael serves in editorial boards of 
over 15 journals, engages in various encyclopedic projects such as The En- 
cyclopaedia of Educational Philosophy and Theory (co-edited with Andrew 
Gibbons, Tina Besley and Berislav Žarnić) (Springer), and contributes to 
popular independent news-portals such as Truthout.   
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Petar Jandrić (PhD) is Senior Lecturer in e-Learning and Director of BSc 
(Informatics) programme at the University of Applied Sciences in Zagreb 
(Croatia), visiting Associate Professor at the University of Zagreb (Croatia), 
professor and Director of Institute for Research and Knowledge Advance- 
ment at the Global Center for Advanced Studies (Michigan, US). His 
research interests are focused to the intersections between critical pedagogy 
and information and communication technologies. Research methodologies 
of his choice are inter-, trans- and anti-disciplinarity. Petar’s previous 
academic affiliations include Croatian Academic and Research Network, 
National e-Science Centre at the University of Edinburgh, Glasgow School 
of Art and Cass School of Education at the University of East London. He 
writes, edits and reviews books, articles, course modules and study guides, 
serves in editorial boards of scholarly journals and conferences, participates 
in diverse projects in Croatia and in the United Kingdom, regularly publishes 
popular science and talks in front of diverse audiences. His recent books are 
Digital Learning (Školske novine & University of Applied Sciences, 2015) 
and Critical Learning in Digital Networks (Springer, 2015).  
 
Learning and Inquiry in the Age of Digital Reason 
 
Petar Jandrić: Dear Michael, it is a real pleasure to talk to you! Admittedly, 
I have been thinking about this conversation for a long time. As editor, you 
provided great feedback and guidance for previous conversations in this 
series. Waiting for right questions to build up, I looked for the best moment 
to talk to you – and here we are. In order to conduct meaningful conver- 
sations, I tend to get a hold of everything written or edited by my inter- 
locutors – in your case, Michael, that is a truly dreadful task! Could you 
please help me and our readers navigate through your immense body of 
work? What are your main preoccupations these days?  
Michael Peters: Thank you, Petar, for this interview. I know the preparations 
you have made and the readings. I am relishing the prospect of conversation 
with you and have looked over the nice statement of your probing questions. 
I guess that I work on three main related themes: philosophy, political knowl- 
edge economy, and academic publishing. In the first theme, philosophy, I 
have a lasting interest in Wittgenstein (at least since my PhD on his later 
works); also Heidegger and Nietzsche; contemporary French philosophers 
such as Foucault, Lyotard, Derrida; critical theory and Frankfurt school 
including Habermas; and American pragmatism, especially Rorty. In the 
second theme, political knowledge economy, I have recently done a trilogy 
Imagination: Three Models of Imagination in the Age of the Knowledge 
Economy (Murphy, Peters & Marginson, 2010). I am also doing quite a lot of 
work on neoliberalism, various books on Higher Education and the University 
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including collaborations with Ron Barnett, social knowledge production, 
creative, knowledge and open knowledge economies, cybernetic capitalism, 
strong influence of Marx and radical political economy mediated through 
theorists like Negri and Hardt. Finally, in the third theme, academic publish- 
ing, I am interested in open journals, journal editing peer review, big data, 
and bibliometrics. 
Let me add to this statement – which really serves only to establish a 
research profile – that the links between themes are much deeper. I am 
interested in the forms of thought: the material and the historical forms that 
thought has taken through genres (philosophy as a kind of writing) and 
through different media. 
PJ: In this series of conversations, I use dialogical approach to explore 
issues pertaining to learning in the age of digital media. What are the main 
challenges in (design and interpretation of) dialogical approach to the theme? 
What are its main advantages?   
MP: As you intimate in your question, dialogue is an ancient form that 
defines the Western philosophical tradition that comes down to us especially 
through the Platonic dialogues, a kind of dramatization of the dialectics 
where Socrates in dialogue with another drives the opponent to an elenchus 
or contradiction. At this point, the game of arguing for the sake of conflict, 
or eristics, is over. While I am hugely interested in this form as a kind of 
philosophical model, I do not think it serves us well today. The power relations 
in the dialogue are not symmetrical and Socrates always wins – although he 
professes ignorance. I am a little skeptical even if the dialectics does turn up 
“truth” or least eliminates spurious nonsense. But then I think it is necessary 
to understand that the form of thought we call dialogue is a dynamic and 
ever-changing vehicle for thought and for engagement.  
Thus, we can talk of many kinds of dialogue based around the innovations 
of Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, and Buber (the existential encounter); Heidegger 
and Gadamer (the hermeneutical model of participants as co-seekers of truth 
aiming at consensus); the critical dialogue of Habermas (“the ideal speech 
situation” without any form of coercion driven by argumentation alone); 
Freire’s dialogue as cultural action; Rorty’s conversation based on Gadamer 
and Oakeshott (“the conversation of mankind”), Wittgenstein’s and Derrida’s 
genres of dialogue as forms of speaking to oneself as an interior dialogue; 
and so on. We need to recognize its various historical forms and to determine 
which model is appropriate, and under what conditions, as a basis for 
learning in the age of digital media. For myself, I herald the structure of the 
peer-to-peer learning dialogue structured by the “we-think” – by a process of 
collective intentionality and the wisdom of the group. This lateral and sym- 
metrical conception is the basis for peer philosophies that I am exploring, 
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especially the peer-to-peer and its implications for collective creativity and 
the intellectual commons. 
PJ: During my studies of physics, technology, social science, and humanities, 
I was privileged to talk and listen about learning in the age of digital media 
with people from diverse research and non-research traditions. Breaking 
through vast differences in jargon and style, I noticed that they are often 
interested in similar themes, express similar concerns, and develop similar 
emotional responses. For a long time, I have felt that these insights could 
become much more powerful if I could only somehow bring them together. 
In this series of conversations, therefore, I am talking to people from six tra- 
ditional disciplines: philosophers, social scientists, educators, media theorists, 
practitioners and activists, artists.  
Placed within a single collection, such series of conversations may become 
a useful resource for someone who wants to read about various perspectives 
in one place. As a research enterprise, however, this series inevitably bumps 
into various epistemological constraints arising from crossing borders between 
traditional disciplines. In a recent interview, you said: “In terms of episte- 
mology and pedagogy I am an anarchist or at least embrace a theory of 
epistemological and pedagogical anarchism (in Feyerabend’s sense). I am a 
little disrespectful of territories, turfs, specializations at least in the humanities 
and social sciences.” (Stickney, 2014: 366–368). In the context of our theme, 
however, I must ask you to look beyond humanities and social sciences. How 
do we break traditional epistemic borders and foster true dialogue across 
various disciplines and worldviews? How can we integrate various strands of 
human knowledge on learning and digital media? 
MP: You have picked up on my anarchist side that I inherit from a range of 
people, but Feyerabend (1993[1970]) put it in a rather delightful form when 
he called it epistemological anarchy – really meaning that we cannot reduce 
method to rules or to logic. In conversation, there is often no telos, par- 
ticipants maybe be radically other, there is no agreed upon goal and no con- 
sensus. In this context, if we believe Chomsky (1957 & 1965), we witness 
the novel utterance (the creative sentence) as a daily phenomenon. The struc- 
ture of conversation is unpredictable, often disjunctive, highly interactive, 
although it may also be simply a set of parallel structures that touch 
occasionally. The dialogue as conversation has a pragmatic element to it that 
reminds me of Bakhtin, Rorty and Pierce (though it different ways).  
The ability to converse clearly is a bonus when one is dialoguing across 
disciplines. In the last instance, however, all disciplines are parasitic on dia- 
logue as ordinary conversation and the conversation goes as long as parties 
are interested. This model (sometimes I say “street philosophy” based on 
street cred) is also radically postfoundational – there are no foundations, it is 
simply anchored in cultural practice and we experiment and do what we do. 
 167 
It seems to me that dialogue as conversation (a topic I have published on) 
(Peters, 2012a) is the universal means of learning. On the unification of 
scientific knowledge I am a little more skeptical because of the failure of the 
logical empiricists who embarked on such a program. So let me say that the 
unification thesis is a philosophical position that needs examining.  
PJ: Could you please examine this philosophical position a bit more closely?    
MP: The thesis and ideal of scientific unification died with the logical posi- 
tivists. Today, according to UNESCO, there are over 3,500 separate fields of 
knowledge (in Peters, 1999). Surely we cannot believe that they are unified 
by something called the “scientific method”? What unifies casebook law, with 
sociology of media, particle physics, or Latin studies? Maybe, at the level of 
knowledge ideals, we might see some commonality. As you can see, I am 
skeptical and not sure why this is considered a problem. I certainly am not a 
scientific reductionist and do not want to collapse social states into physical 
states and physical states into micro-physical states. Although, I do think that 
the emerging epoch of digital reason is homogenizing scientific practices 
and actually changing the nature of science through “big data” analysis. 
Education itself has its own variation in “learning analytics.” 
PJ: Could you please assess the role of “big data” and “learning analytics” 
in contemporary education?  
MP: This is a huge question that I am currently exploring in a special issue 
of Policy Futures in Education co-edited with Robert Lingard, Tina Besley 
and Jillian Blackmore (to be published in 2016). Farnam Jahanian, who heads 
the National Science Foundation directorate for Computer and Information 
Science and Engineering (CISE), presented a paper entitled “The Promise of 
Big Data” at the Big Data Partners Workshop on 3 May, 2013, as part of The 
White House Initiative of Big Data, 2012, where he made the following 
claim: “Advances in information technologies are transforming the fabric of 
our society, and data represents a transformative new currency for science, 
engineering, education and commerce” (Jahanian, 2013: 2). Jahanian suggests 
that a “paradigm shift” has occurred from “Hypothesis-driven to Data-driven 
Discovery” and he illustrates this claim by reference to three sources: 
1. Science – In the 11 February 2011 issue, Science writers joined with col- 
leagues from Science Signalling, Science Translational Medicine, and Science 
Careers to provide a broad look at the issues surrounding the influx of 
research data (Science Editorial Collective, 2011). The collection of articles 
highlights both the challenges posed by the data deluge and the opportunities 
that can be realised if we can better organize and access the data. 
2. The Economist’s 14-page special report: The data deluge (The Economist, 
2010).  
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3. Microsoft Research’s (2009) The Fourth Paradigm: Data Intensive Sci- 
entific Discovery which, it claimed, presented the first broad look at the 
rapidly emerging field of data intensive science. 
These sources and a range of other related initiatives indicate a profound 
shift in the nature of knowledge production. As Bernard Steigler (2014) 
writes in The Digital Future of the University, “The digital constitutes a new 
épistémè: it is the very nature of knowledge in all its forms that will be 
affected. This technology will function for our epoque in the same way that 
writing did for antiquity.” Bernard Stiegler is a French philosopher at Gold- 
smiths, University of London and at the Université de Technologie de Com- 
piègne. 
“Analytics” is a term used in business and science to refer to computa- 
tional support for capturing digital data to help inform decision-making 
(UNESCO, 2012: 1). “Learning analytics” is a term used by those in the 
education community who are seeking to understand the implications of these 
developments for how we analyze learning data for use by organizations to 
improve learning systems (ibid). Learning Analytics involves the use of 
computational techniques to analyze learner data, generate visualizations of 
learning dynamics, and build predictive models to test theories. As data can 
be gathered in real time, the proposal is that there is a possibility of con- 
tinuous improvement via multiple feedback loops. As you can see from this 
brief description, there are many issues not least to do with control, access to 
data, authority to access data and for what reasons, student surveillance. And 
the list goes on and on: Foucault might be justified in reactivating the con- 
cept of educational panopticum. 
PJ: During the past few decades, major breakthroughs in natural sciences 
such as physics, chemistry or medicine seem to result almost exclusively 
from the work of large teams. Gone is the time of lone rangers who develop 
theories and ideas in isolation of their studies and laboratories; by and large, 
they have been replaced by large managed teams of experts in narrow 
disciplines. In social science and humanities, however, the most respected 
achievement is still an academic monograph – a piece of research conducted 
by one or few persons. Could you please compare these two approaches to 
inquiry? Could you please outline their main implications for creativity?  
MP: I know this is a common view but have not reviewed the empirical 
evidence for such a claim. Clearly, the digital humanities and social media 
technologies increasingly breakdown the isolation of the long-distance scholar. 
I do think that this Romantic ideal and practice is a feature of the past and 
that more and more people in the humanities will come together collectively 
to advance their research. Think of the conferences and other collective forms 
of knowledge production in the humanities and social sciences. Increasingly, 
I think, we will see new collective forms of knowledge production in these 
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areas – and not only because of changed technological conditions. Nowadays, 
state and regional bureaucracies are demanding and mandating new collective 
processes in the education of doctoral students, and team approaches are 
becoming incentivized through research funding.  
On the two models of inquiry, I tried to answer this question in a paper 
called “Education, Creativity and the Economy of Passions: New Forms of 
Educational Capitalism.” If I can quote from part of the abstract: 
 
This paper reviews claims for creativity in the economy and in 
education distinguishing two accounts: ‘personal anarcho-aesthetics’ 
and ‘the design principle.’ The first emerges in the psychological 
literature from sources in the Romantic Movement emphasizing 
the creative genius and the way in which creativity emerges from 
deep subconscious processes, involves the imagination, is anchored 
in the passions, cannot be directed and is beyond the rational 
control of the individual. This account has a close fit to business as 
a form of ‘brainstorming,’ ‘mind-mapping’ or ‘strategic planning,’ 
and is closely associated with the figure of the risk-taking entre- 
preneur. By contrast, ‘the design principle’ is both relational and 
social and surfaces in related ideas of ‘social capital,’ ‘situated 
learning,’ and ‘P2P’ (peer-to-peer) accounts of commons-based 
peer production. It is seen to be a product of social and networked 
environments – rich semiotic and intelligent environments in which 
everything speaks. (Peters, 2009b) 
 
Philosophy’s Pedagogy  
 
PJ: You are a philosopher and a publisher – above all, however, you are a 
teacher. In the introduction to your Selected Works (2012b: 8) and in more 
detail elsewhere (Peters & Marshall, 1999; Peters, Burbules & Smeyers, 2008), 
you write about pedagogical philosophers, or “provocateurs,” and develop 
the notions of “philosophy as pedagogy” and “pedagogical philosophy.” 
Could you please outline the links between philosophy and pedagogy? How 
do they reflect in your own work?  
MP: Quite simply, I say that pedagogy is historically one of the tripos of 
ancient Greek society, which took hold after the institutionalization of 
philosophy along with politics (education for citizenship in the polis). What 
stronger link could there be? This tripos intimately links philosophy, politics 
and pedagogy especially with respect to the demos and the democratic way 
of life. Much follows from this, especially the important questions of the 
digital age such as collective intelligence, collective action, co-construction 
and co-design of democratic goods. Philosophy as pedagogy implies that phi- 
losophy depends upon the pedagogical forms of the dialogue – the seminar, 
lecture, tutorial etc. – which are the oral equivalents of the written genres of 
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the treatise, thesis, fable, manifesto etc. The philosophers I favor are those I 
call pedagogical philosophers: Socrates, Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, 
Dewey, Freire. These ideas are explicitly reflected in my work related to 
developing the conception of philosophy as pedagogy and implicitly reflected 
in my pedagogical practice. For more detail, see my recent book Of Other 
Thoughts: Non-Traditional Ways to the Doctorate: A Guidebook for Candi- 
dates and Supervisors (Engels-Schwarzpaul & Peters, 2013).  
PJ: In a great overview article entitled “Towards Philosophy of Technology 
in Education: Mapping the Field,” you outline the main streams in contem- 
porary philosophy of technology and show that  
 
it has crucial significance for education for education is not only a 
discipline often conceived as the study of education with an accent 
on its improvement, it is also a giant enterprise, increasing the 
centre of the knowledge economy, where such improvements are 
now driven by both economic theories concerning the importance 
of technology and technical innovations touted to transform its 
development (Peters, 2006: 112). 
 
Could you please outline your philosophy of technology? Who are your main 
theoretical influences; how does it work in practice?   
MP:  I am interested in the history of the philosophy of technology and its 
emerging political economy. I am strongly influenced by Heidegger, but 
reject aspects of his analysis related to the promise of digital technology by 
holding out for non-capitalist forms that establish ecologies of public or open 
spaces for global civil culture to flourish. In this I am also influenced by 
Marcuse’s One-dimensional Man (1964) and Foucault’s Technologies of the 
Self (1982). This thrust in my thinking has two prongs:  
(1) An analysis of cybernetic rationality and the form it takes with the 
massive new info-utilities, its replacement of the old gas and oil industries of 
industrial capitalism, and its dominance of the so-called knowledge economy.   
(2) An attempt to support, analyze and build public knowledge cultures, a 
term I invented and used in my book Building Knowledge Cultures: Education 
and Development in the Age of Knowledge Capitalism (Peters and Besley, 
2006). I have pursued public knowledge cultures in various ways, especially 
around the development of new journals but also in relation to the history of 
open journals systems, open publishing, the intellectual commons and the sorts 
of things that I talk about in The Virtues of Openness (Peters and Roberts, 
2012).  
Using these two prongs, I want to scrutinize more carefully the philoso- 
phers of liberal modernity (Dewey, Popper, Habermas) who do not understand 
the significance of “counterpublics” and the control of public discourse. 
PJ: In the age of the network, philosophy of education contains elements of 
(philosophy of) pedagogy, technology, politics…. Arguably, these elements 
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have always been there – however, it is hardly to dispute that modernity 
creates a unique dynamic between them. Engineering traditions of philosophy 
of technology seem less suitable than humanistic traditions (Peters, 2006: 
112); analytic tradition of R. S. Peters and the London School seem to offer 
only a part of the picture (Peters, 2014: 114–117); Heidegger’s “only a God 
can save us” (1981) is obviously overly pessimistic; and Haraway’s project 
of socialist-feminism (1991) has been surpassed by other approaches as “the 
cognisphere takes up where the cyborg left off” (Hayles, 2006: 165). In your 
view, Michael, what is the current state of the art of contemporary philosophy 
of education? What does it mean to be a philosopher of education in early 
21st century?  
MP:  This is such an important question I would like to make it the centre of 
a conference or journal issue. And I have thought about this question. First, I 
would go for the easy answer, and say that all these traditions have some- 
thing to offer – the question is knowing their proper place. There is nothing 
wrong with conceptual analysis, but not as a sole activity. Heidegger helps us 
to view the history of Western metaphysics, but there are alternative readings. 
Haraway and Hayles respectively take us into a gendered analysis of tech- 
nology and its posthuman forms – and these are both crucial advances. In my 
view, we need to understand new postdisciplinary formations that are best 
represented by the rise of ecology as a young science.  
Based on a radical transdisciplinarity, the new postdisciplinary formations 
proceed from an understanding of open, non-linear, dynamical systems 
(characterized by cybernetics, chaos and complexity) where something new 
can be born. (Perhaps the best approach is that of cosmological physics of 
evolution or biological evolution applied to the understanding of the signif- 
icance of information in the universe). I would like to change the term but 
for me there is no value in clarifying concepts when kids are victims of war, 
going hungry, have no access to education, and are being systematically 
exploited. All of these intellectual activities must be put in the service of 
caring for our children and the planet otherwise it meaningless to me.  
PJ: You are “a thinker typically understood as a postmodern and poststruc- 
turalist philosopher/educator” (Papastepanou, 2012: 2836). Yet, you seem to 
collaborate perfectly well with (neo)-Marxist humanist thinkers such as Peter 
McLaren – who also happen to launch powerful critiques of postmodernism / 
poststructuralism (i.e. McLaren, 2006). From first-hand experience, I know 
that Peter is a great person to work with (and I also know that you are dear 
friends!) so your collaboration arrives at no surprise. Looking at theory 
behind the person, however, could you please outline your main argument for 
and against neo-Marxism? Why do you think that postmodern/ poststructuralist 
approaches are the way to go? 
 172 
MP: In my recent response to Peter, who as a dear friend contributed to my 
recent festschrift Postscript on Marxism (Lăzăroiu, 2014), I responded: 
 
These labels ‘revolutionary Marxism,’ ‘postmodernism’ and ‘post- 
structuralism’ should be not taken too literally in my view. The 
process of identification by association can be scary but like any 
stereotyping mechanism we can and should reject these broad 
descriptions as being definitive of philosophical identity and work 
instead with what scholars say – we should follow the arguments.  
 
I went on to say: 
 
…if you want to understand postmodernism read, view and listen 
to the music, theatre, architecture, dance, philosophy, literature, 
sociology, criticism, cultural studies, economics etc. that developed 
in different cultural conditions in America, Britain, Australia, China, 
India, South America and elsewhere. What can one say about this 
diversity except the banal comment that post-modernism can be 
characterized as a reevaluation and critique of the culture of 
modernism, and a reaction against its universalist tendencies? What 
do these artists, architects, musicians and writers share? What do 
Robert Venturi, Charles Jencks, Charles Olson, John Cage, Terry 
Riley, Henryk Gorecki, George Crumb, Steve Reich, Phillip Glass, 
Lou Harrison, Michael Nyman, Jorge Luis Borges, Samuel Beckett, 
Vladimir Nabokov, William Gaddis, William Burroughs, Kurt 
Vonnegut, John Barth, Donald Barthelme, E. L. Doctorow, Don 
DeLillo, Thomas Pynchon, Kathy Acker have in common? What 
do these philosophers have in common: Nietzsche, Heidegger, Der- 
rida, Foucault, Lyotard, Rorty, Jameson? This is why I say it really 
should be seen less as a label and more as a guide to reading.  
 
And if you will excuse for reproducing more of my response here: 
 
Certainly, postmodernism and poststructuralism should be treated 
as guides to reading but we might also suppose that there are some 
serious commitments. The philosophical reading of postmodernism, 
considered as a whole, tends to emphasize a number of over- 
lapping cluster concepts that emphasize its openness, its critique 
of essence or essentiality, and its philosophy of difference, and 
protection of diversity, including the following: anti-foundational- 
ism; anti-essentialism; anti- or post-epistemological standpoint; 
anti-realism about meaning and reference; suspicion of transcen- 
dental arguments and viewpoints; rejection of the picture of knowl- 
edge as accurate representation; rejection of truth as correspondence 
to reality; rejection of canonical descriptions and final vocabu- 
laries; suspicion of metanarratives. 
 
The list is taken from Bernd Magnus’ (1989) discussion of Nie- 
tzsche in relation to postmodern criticism. To Magnus’ list we 
 173 
might also add what Rorty calls ‘antirepresentationalism’ and also 
add, alongside ‘suspicion of metanarratives’, the turn to narrative 
and narratology, more generally – the ‘petite récits’ pitted against 
metanarratives by Lyotard (1984). We might also add an emphasis 
on linguistic use and therapeutic view of philosophy; that is, an 
embodiment of many of the features of the list above and an ethos, 
above all, concerning philosophy as a critique of language summed 
up best in the famous quotation from the Investigations: “Philos- 
ophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by 
means of language” (#109). It is a view that underlies the develop- 
ment of social sciences and cultural studies in the latter half of the 
twentieth-century; perhaps, sloganized in the twin methodological 
imperatives: the linguistic turn, the significance of representation, 
and the so-called ‘social construction of reality,’ on the one hand; 
and, the attempt to overcome the dualisms, the search for certainty 
and essences, and the subjectivism that is the legacy of the Cartesian 
thought. (Peters, 2014: 210–215) 
 
Let me add to this by saying intellectual thought is driven too much by labels 
and by imprecise categories that operate on the principle of exclusion and 
“death of association’ when really we all should be doing the hard work of 
actually tracing the connections, influences, similarities, differences and 
theoretical hybrids. 
I have never rejected Marxism or neo-Marxism. All I would say that the 
forms of Western Marxism are diverse. There are many different forms 
including Heideggerian Marxism of Marcuse, and the Marxism of Deleuze 
and Guattari, or the autonomist Marxism of Antonio Negri. In fact I find 
contemporary Italian political thinking that follows this tradition and tries to 
combine Marx, Foucault and Deleuze very fruitful for my purposes. I wrote 
a little book called Poststructuralism, Marxism and Neoliberalism: Between 
Theory and Politics (Peters, 2001a) with the aim of demonstrating that 
“poststructuralism” is not anti-Marxist or anti-structuralist. Also the term “post- 
structuralism” is so jejune: it obscures the links to Nietzsche and Heidegger, 
it masks the differences between thinkers, it exploits inherent bias in national 
traditions, and raises the question of the lack of interpenetration between 
European traditions of thought by reifying nationalism in philosophy. It is an 
American term that conflates “difference” which is one of the central lessons 
of this complex movement. 
 
Where Is Digital (Post)Colonialism? 
 
PJ: Speaking of difference, it is impossible to avoid its mirror image – 
universalism. Could you please explore it in few sentences?  
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MP: I am suspicious of universalism as a cover for various forms of ethno- 
centrism, westernization, modernization, Europeanization, Americanization. 
There are surely pedagogical lessons in this, if we take colonialism and 
postcolonialism seriously. In every case that purports a universalism, we 
must subject it to severe intellectual tests and make sure that it is not simply 
the cultural projection of the dominant power. This is an ethical and political 
obligation of all thinkers, especially those of the “imperial” west. On the other 
hand, I am interested in the evolutionary rationality that develops as a form 
of globalism which moves us closer to a set of values that might provide a 
global ethics of the environment and of the other. So, as Heraclitus suggests 
“things change” and as Darwin suggests “they evolve:” What do these 
evolutionary arguments mean for logic and for critical philosophy? How do 
we take advantage of them in intercultural philosophy?  
For me, the best systems of thought here are based on the lessons of 
Gödel’s incompleteness theorem (the inherent limitation of all axiomatic sys- 
tems including the attempt to give arithmetic logical foundations), Heisenberg’s 
uncertainty principle (that states a fundamental limit to precision of measure- 
ment at the subatomic level), and Einstein’s relativity theories (observation 
is relative to the observer). They are in contemporary terms dealing with 
one-linear, dynamical, open, transformational systems – I think the best 
examples are applications of dynamic system analysis in cosmological physics 
and evolutionary biology. We need to apply similar approaches to history and 
philosophy, especially when analyzing or theorizing emerging global systems.  
PJ: Emerging global systems are in many ways universalist and hegemonic. 
For instance, the Internet is a prime example of domination of English 
language and Latin alphabet. At the one hand, such unification provides 
people with far-reaching and potentially powerful voices; at the other hand, 
however, it diminishes importance of local systems of thought and knowl- 
edges. As a Wittgensteinian philosopher, could you please assess the relation- 
ships between the Internet and “language games”? More generally, could 
you please assess the dynamic between individualism and collectivism in the 
network society?  
MP: In terms of world languages: Mandarin, Spanish, English, Hindi, 
Arabic, Portuguese, Bengali, Russian, Japanese, Punjabi, German. As we all 
know the Internet, like the world publishing and knowledge systems, favor 
English as the lingua franca. Although, this is rapidly changing, and possible 
soon to be replaced by Mandarin. This reflects the geopolitics of language, 
including forced language acquisition and the prohibition of various indig- 
enous languages in schools. In New Zealand, Maori was forbidden to be 
spoken in a period before the 1980s! Language dominance is a consequence 
of colonialism and conquest, and therefore cannot be divorced from questions 
of power and politics of imperialism. As a consequence of globalization, we 
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have also seen what anthropologists call small language death – especially in 
the Pacific, with 250 Aboriginal languages in Australia, and 500 in Borneo 
and surrounding islands. On the other hand, it could be argued that the 
Internet is the best platform for language revival and the best possibility for 
enhancing small language reproduction including of these languages that are 
predominantly oral. So this is a double-edged question. As far as the general 
question goes, individualism is associated with property rights as they can be 
extended to intellectual property, while collectivism per se shows itself in new 
forms of collective intelligence such as peer production – which is a feature 
of social media in general and a development out of open affordances. 
PJ: In the review essay “Mapping the New Imperialism: Where Is Postcolo- 
nialism,” you say: “The question is a spatial one. Where is postcolonialism? 
It’s a question of location, or more precisely relocation” (Peters, 2003: 421). 
In the context of your essay, “location” refers to disciplinarity – modernism, 
Marxism, decolonization, postmodernism, poststructuralism… However, please 
allow me to relocate (post)colonialism into the border between reality and 
virtuality to develop a metaphor of colonization of cyberspace. (As of 
recently, Ana Kuzmanić and I have done some work in this direction (Jandrić 
& Kuzmanić, 2015)). In this context, which lessons from colonization of 
physical spaces should we bring along into our collective journey into 
virtuality? In short, Michael, where is digital postcolonialism?      
MP: In order to explore this question we need first to explore “digital 
colonialism” and the question of question the term colonialism (which has a 
reasonably precise meaning in relation to the exercise of imperial power by 
the West over its colonies). Given that the “digital” in the sense of the 
coming of the Internet has been around only since the 1990s we are talking 
about a relatively short period in human history, say roughly twenty-five 
years. I am not sure that the term makes sense unless it stands for a set of 
unequal power relations extended over a colony. Are there “digital colonies”? 
Certainly we can say clearly there are unequal power relations between those 
with online access and those without it and therefore inequalities of access to 
education, information and knowledge. We might also say that the new 
digital centers of power are associated with the growth of the leviathan info-
utilities that emerged out of the computer and information service corporation, 
mostly all American. By a stretch I think we might come to accept that 
“digital colonies” are information conduits for American culture and provide 
little chance for the development of indigenous digital cultures.  
Now “digital postcolonialism” then would equate with the opportunity 
for user-generated cultures to flourish in an open and collaborative digital 
environment. One thing that strikes me here is the way that the digital 
postcolonialism does not map onto the map of the world as it is broken up 
into countries — mainly the administrative division of Western powers. In 
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some cases it does, especially we talk about indigenous peoples (where there 
is proximity to land), and in some cases there is no real attachment to any 
country or piece of land. The new “postcolonial cultures” are driven by new 
social movements that have developed digital presence and extensions, or 
new user groups of shared interest that are pragmatically oriented. I think 
your work in this respect is interesting and useful when you say that digital 
postcolonialism “rejects common simplifications such as technological deter- 
minism and points to small power dis-balances as the main sites of resistance 
against the pairing of techno-education with global neo-liberal ideologies” 
(Jandrić & Kuzmanić, 2015). I think you make a good point. The real object 
of study should be digital capitalism or what I call the forms of cybernetic 
capitalism, hence my concern for what is possible and new forms of power 
and control in the epoch of digital reason. 
PJ: In the context of cybernetic capitalism, it is impossible to avoid the 
Frankfurt School of Social Science. What are its main contributions to our 
understanding of learning in the age of digital media?   
MP: Of course the Frankfurt School is no more; it is no longer a school in 
Frankfurt having been disestablished by the university. However, its theoret- 
ical legacy around the work of first, second and third generation thinkers is 
useful. Think only of Adorno and Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment 
(2002[1944]), or their critique of instrumental rationality. From Grunberg to 
first generation of Adorno, Horkheimer, Fromm, Benjamin, Pollock, Lowen- 
thal, and Reich; to the second generation of Habermas, Dahrendorf, Brandt, 
Offe, Schmidt, and Wellmer; to the third generation who move offshore and 
into the Third World represented by Honneth, Martin Jay, Chantal Mouffe but 
also Spivak, Fraser, Bhaba, and many others; critical theory has provided a 
living testimony of the power of radical political economy of Marx and Engels.  
I do not know the work of Rainer Forst, but I believe that he is said to 
constitute a fourth generation. When he won the Leibniz prize in 2012, Forst 
was named the most important philosopher of his generation. He usefully 
stages the historical development of the Frankfurt School around the program 
of Dialectic of Enlightenment (Horkheimer and Adorno, 2002[1944]).  
Habermas’ reformulation around the Hegelian-Weberian-Marxist inspired 
critical theory of communication and its distortion in the modern world, and 
Honneth’s reformulation of social struggle as social recognition, to build own 
critique of “relation of justification.” See Forst’s book Contexts of Justice: 
Political Philosophy beyond Liberalism and Communitarianism (2002) and 
also the interview between Reiner Forst and Xavier Guillaume (Guillaume, 
2012).  
Forst says the main question of critical theory is still the same: what is the 
rational ordering of society and what prevents it? The question he acknowl- 
edges requires a self-reflexivity about “reason.” In one sense I think this is a 
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very German project, insofar as it revolves around the concept vernünftig 
(“rational”). While I respect Forst’s answer, this is not my question. I am 
more interested in the descent of systems of thought, their mutations as they 
are exported and then picked up in foreign contexts. In this sense, I am more 
interested in application of critical theory in Third World contexts. Critical 
theory has gone off-shore, a process that helps to shed its Eurocentric bias.  
PJ: Looking at philosophical roots of your work, I cannot help but ask about 
your life-long fascination with Wittgenstein. Where does it come from; how 
does it reflect to your philosophy of education?   
MP: I was a school teacher for seven years. During this time, in conversation 
with mathematicians, I was really turned on to logic. Rod Harries, Assistant 
Principal who was also tutor in philosophy, persuaded me to do a degree in 
philosophy of science at Canterbury University, where Karl Popper was from 
1937–43. We started with the movement of logicism, with Frege, Russell 
and the early Wittgenstein, and moved on to Popper, Kuhn, Feyerabend, etc. 
I was hooked. Rod was also the reason to go back to university again, this 
time Auckland University, to study Wittgenstein in a Masters degree. Here, I 
managed to swing every paper around to look at aspects of Wittgenstein’s 
work starting with the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1974). This kind of 
work really clicked with me and I emerged with a Master with First Class 
Honours that secured a PhD scholarship allowing me to complete a thesis on 
Wittgenstein and the problem of rationality.  
After the thesis which I never published, I was intrigued with Lyotard’s 
creative misreading of Wittgenstein, and that sent me down a certain track. I 
subsequently wrote two books on Wittgenstein with friends Jim Marshall 
(Peters & Marshall, 1999), Nick Burbules and Paul Smeyers (Peters, Bur- 
bules and Smeyers, 2008), and also held conversations with another Wittgen- 
steinian Fazal Rizvi. It was the source of my ideas of philosophy as pedagogy 
and of the notion of pedagogical philosophers which I have developed over 
the years. I could say much more about this influence, especially the ways in 
which – through the cultural turn and an emphasis on social practice (a view 
that strongly influenced Pierre Bourdieu) – Wittgenstein was responsible for 
a paradigm change in the humanities and social sciences, alongside the huge 
influence he had in logic, philosophy and mathematics. 
PJ: Could you please outline the main trajectories of this paradigm change 
in the context of contemporary learning?  
MP: Let me refer readers to an Introduction I wrote recently to an online 
collection of my articles entitled “Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of the 
Subject” where  
 
I outline a view of subjectivity, knowledge, and representation 
‘after’ Wittgenstein, a position that provides a more appropriate 
platform for philosophy of education in the age of globalization, 
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preserving a link to Wittgenstein and his philosophy while inves- 
tigating the sources for a notion of education as openness and 
engagement. (Peters, 2014) 
 
In this text, I offer some remarks of the significance of Wittgenstein’s work 
in breaking with and offering a critique of the Cartesian model of subjectivity 
and cognition. My argument in general is that Wittgenstein’s disassembly of 
the Cartesian model of subjectivity provides the basis for model of education 
as openness, engagement and copoiesis (co-creation), one that is more suited 
to the global, networked and digital environment we live in.  
I am more convinced than ever that Wittgenstein’s work, especially of the 
Philosophical Investigations (2001) and On Certainty (1975), gives us some 
of the tools to understand cognition in terms of enactivism and the extended 
mind. Enactivism is shorthand for a view of the mind in terms of the indi- 
vidual’s and species interaction with the environment. It is a view associated 
with Varela’s and Maturana’s biological pragmatism that emphasizes embodied 
cognition. Wittgenstein gives us grounds for challenging the computational 
analysis of minds as individualist, internalist and locked away from the 
world. On this view, very common to cognitivist scientists, cognition is best 
seen by analogy to the computer. Let us say this is the dominant view of the 
digital age. By contrast, Wittgenstein enables us to see that the mind is to be 
identified with purposeful activity in the world, only realizable through the 
activities of the body, and extended by tools usage in a language-dominated 
social environment. This is a very different paradigm of cognition. It is one 
that understands the significance of “meaning as use” and the importance of 
social practice as the intersubjective basis for knowledge.  
This is one of starting points in my work with Tina Besley in Building 
Knowledge Cultures (Peters and Besley, 2006). Recently, I have come to 
think that it underlies a conception of collective intelligence that allows for 
the co-creation and co-production of knowledge, of digital goods in general, 
and of social democratic processes. There are strong links from this form of 
digital epistemology and epistemic democracy to issues of academic publish- 
ing in open formats: the future of the scholarly journal, the philosophical and 
historical significance of peer review and the centrality of peer production of 
knowledge.  
PJ: Then, knowledge cultures are directly linked to the notion of “philosophy 
as pedagogy”… 
MP: One last word about “philosophy as pedagogy” and “pedagogical phi- 
losophers:” philosophy as pedagogy concerns a “style of thinking” and a way 
of doing philosophy. In other words, as I explain in the essay “Philosophy as 
Pedagogy: Wittgenstein’s Styles of Thinking:” “Wittgenstein not as a philos- 
opher who provides a method for analysing educational concepts but rather 
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as one who approaches philosophical questions from a pedagogical point of 
view” and   
 
his [Wittgenstein’s] styles are, I will argue, essentially pedagogical; 
he provides a teaming variety and vital repertoire of non-argumen- 
tational discursive forms – pictures, drawings, analogies, similes, 
jokes, equations, dialogues with himself, little narratives, questions 
and wrong answers, thought experiments, gnomic aphorisms and 
so on – as a means primarily to shift our thinking, to help us escape 
the picture that holds us captive. (Peters, 2001b)  
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